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Case No. 20411 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. WHETHER A VENDEE IN THE PURCHASE OF REAL PROPERTY 
PLACED IN ESCROW HAS UNTIL DELIVERY OF DEED FROM DEPOSITORY 
AFTER THE FINAL PAYMENT IS MADE TO REQUIRE REFORMATION OF 
CONTRACT. 
2 . WHETHER A SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY 
CHARGED WITH INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE AND CLAIMS OF A PURPORTED 
PRIOR PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY BY REASON OF RECORDING OF A 
NOTICE OF CONTRACT INTEREST, AND AFTER PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF 
CLAIM TO REAL PROPERTY, CAN BE PLACED IN TITLE IN A SUIT TO 
VOID THE CONVEYANCE TO HIM BECAUSE OF THE RUNNING OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (THREE YEARS FROM DISCOVERY OF MISTAKE) 
PRIOR TO AN ACTION BEING BROUGHT TO CORRECT AN ERROR IN THE 
CONTRACT AND DEED. 
3 . WHETHER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD AND 
MISTAKE IS TOLLED WHERE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE STATUTE RUNS 
IS IN POSSESSION OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES. 
1 
4. WHETHER THE STATUTE OF UMITATIONS RUNS AGAINST 
A PARTY IN AN ACTION WHO FILES AN ACTION AFTER DISCOVERY OF A 
MISTAKE BUT DOES NOT ALLEGE FRAUD OR MISTAKE 
STATUTES 
1, Section 78-12-26(3) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended: 
Within three years : An action for relief on the ground of 
fraud or mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall 
not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plain t i ffs/Appellants b rough t action seek ing affirmative rel ief to 
compel v e n d o r s Mars ings to convey to Appellants an acre of land that was 
not contained in the contract and deed of the se l l e r s (Marsing) claiming 
fraud and m i s t a k e . Plaintiffs/Appellants also asked that a s u b s e q u e n t 
w a r r a n t y deed to successo r p u r c h a s e r s of the d isputed ac re be voided and 
canceled and for a t to rney ' s fees in the sum of $5,000. (R 5) The t r i a l cour t 
g ran ted Defendants /Respondents motion for summary judgment b e c a u s e 
Plaint iff /Appellants action was not brought within th ree y e a r s of hav ing 
d i scovered the alleged fraud or mis take , (R 164, 170, 172) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Responden ts Mars ing originally owned a piece of r e a l p r o p e r t y 
si tuated in S la t e rv i l l e , Weber County , Utah, that i s bas ica l ly long and 
n a r r o w , r u n n i n g genera l ly South to North with a frontage of 143 feet on 
Pioneer Road. Respondents Mars ing had constructed a r e s i d e n c e on the 
South two a c r e s , fronting the county road . 
P r io r to October , 1977, Respondents Mars ing sold the South two 
ac re s with the r e s idence s i tuated ^hereon to Defendants Dennis and on 
October 5 , 1977, sold to Appellants Beckstead a port ion of the remain ing 
p r o p e r t y with the deed rec i t ing that the beg inn ing point was "913.6 feet 
North of the county road" (R 2) This descr ipt ion left u n c o n v e y e d , at the 
t ime, the a rea between 609 feet North of the point of beg inn ing and 913.6 
feet North of the point of b e g i n n i n g , which consis ts of approximate ly one a c r e . 
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In December 1977, Respondents Marsing deeded the unconveyed 
one acre to Respondents Dennis. This deed was recorded in the Weber 
County Recorders Office on May 8, 1979. (R 4, 139) Dennis fenced in 
said acre and occupied the same to the exclusion of all other part ies . 
(R 121, 122) . On July 31, 1981, Respondent Dennis deeded to Respondents 
McBride the three acres then owned by Dennis which comprised the or i -
ginal two acres with the residence and the one acre situated immediately 
to the North of the original two acres deeded to the Dennis' and adjacent 
to the South boundry of the Beckstead property. (R 4) 
On February 16, 1979, Becksteads sold the property they were 
purchasing from Respondents Marsings to Appellants Bertrand and Fontaine 
(R 6, 7) and for some reason Appellant Beckstead can not explain why the 
party preparing the deed did not use the proper description by which 
Beckstead had obtained the property from Marsings which consists of nine 
acres , but used a description that, in effect, moved their south boundry 
one acre south of their deeded property line and took in the one acre that 
Marsing had reserved between the Dennis property and the Beckstead prop-
erty ( R 6 , 7) , In effect, Appellant Beckstead sold to Appellants Bertrand 
and Fontaine more property than she had been sold by Respondents Marsing 
and now attempts to reform her deed from Respondents Marsing to include 
the south one acre not included in her deed so that she can clear the error 
she has made in the deed to Bertrand and Fontaine, 
The complaint of the plaintiff, which was filed on August 9, 1982, 
alleges fraud and mistake on the part of the Defendants Marsing as follows: 
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" 4 . That on or about the 5th day of October , 1977, Defendant 
Bober t W. Mars ing and Gay Marsing contracted to sell to Plaintiff 
Gay M. Beckstead and a Uniform Real Estate Contract was executed 
on said date be tween said p r o p e r t i e s , a copy of which is attached 
he re to and made a p a r t thereof by r e fe rence . That dur ing the 
negot ia t ions for sa le of said p r o p e r t y , said Defendants Mars ings 
r e p r e s e n t e d to Plaintiff Beckstead that t he re were ten acres of land 
^fo sa id prdperty. That d u r i n g said negotiations Defendants Mars ings 
\ f reprssented toPlairitiff Beckstead that the location of the sou thern 
b o u n d r y of sa id pa rce l was a fence , which fence was approximately 
609 ^  nor th from the center of a county road . T h a t , in fact, the 
desc r ip t ion for said contract was changed so as to include only n ine 
ac r e s r a t h e r than the ten ac res be ing sold by the defendants * * *. 
Tha t the desc r ip t ion of the rea l estate contract i s not the p r o p e r t y 
in tended by the p a r t i e s to be conveyed and that it does not d e s c r i b e 
the p r o p e r t y in tended to b e sold and pu rchased in said cont rac t . 
Because of an e r r o r in the descr ip t ion the numerical f igure 913.6 
was i n s e r t e d in the seventh line of the descr ip t ion in the place of 609. f 
^ Dur ing the s p r i n g of 1979, Plaintiffs d iscovered the e r r o r in 
^thfe contrac t and d e e d . " (Emphasis added) (R2,3) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appel lants al lege that they entered into an agreement with 
Responden t s Mars ings for the p u r c h a s e of ten ac res of r ea l proper ty ; that 
Responden t s Mars ings " r ep re sen t ed" that the re we re ten acres (R 2, 3 ) , 
b u t when the agreement was pu t in wr i t ing and a deed p repa red that " the 
ag reement was changed so as to inc lude only nine a c r e s . " (R 2); that 
t h e r e w a s "an e r r o r in desc r ip t ion" (R 3) , and that it was the "actual 
in ten t ion" (R 3) , of the pa r t i e s that t he re should b e conveyed ten ac res 
ins tead of the n ine ac r e s p rov ided for in the contract and deed (R 3) . 
Appe l l an t s al lege in p a r a g r a p h five (5) of the i r complaint that the fraud 
o r mis t ake was d i scovered b y the plaintiffs in the s p r i n g of 1979. (R 3) . 
They also placed the time of l ea rn ing of the fraud or mistake in March or 
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April of 1979 (R 144, 145) . In May of 1979 Appellants further learned of 
the fraud or mistake when a warranty deed, dated December 5, 1977, to 
the disputed acre was recorded on May 8, 1979, in the Weber County Re-
corders office by Defendants Dennis, naming Dennis1 as grantees (R 139) . 
Appellants were also informed by Dennis personally in May of 1979 that 
he had received a deed to the disputed acre (R 145) . Respondents McBridefs 
Motion for Summary Judgment was based upon the facts that Appellants1 
action was not brought within three years after the discovery of the alleged 
fraud or mistake and, therefore, barred by Section 78-12-26 (3), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, which is as follows: 
"78-12-26 WITHIN THREE YEARS -
Within three years : * * * * (3) An action for relief on the grounds 
of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall not be 
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of 
the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
WHETHER A VENDEE IN THE PURCHASE OF REAL PROPERTY 
PLACED IN ESCROW HAS UNTIL DELIVERY OF DEED FROM 
DEPOSITORY AFTER THE FINAL PAYMENT IS MADE TO REQUIRE 
REFORMATION OF CONTRACT. 
1, The issue raised by Appellants is not relevant. The issue raised 
by Appellants is an affirmative defense that could be raised by Respondents 
Mar sing and Appellants complain that Mar sings have not done so . They need 
not do so inasmuch as Appellants have alleged fraud and mistake and have 
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thus given Eespondents the opportunity of raising the three year statute of 
limitations provided for in 78-12-26(3) . 
Appellants cited in support of their argument Hurwitz v . David B . 
Richards and Company,436 P2d 794 (20 U. 2d 232) , which provides for the 
remedies of a vendee based on an anticipatory breach. They are: 
" 1 , Treat the entire contract as broken and sue for damages.? 
*2
 T Treat the contract as still binding and wait until the time 
arises for its performance and at such time bring an action on 
the contract, * 
f 3 . Rescind the contract and sue for the money paid or for the 
value of services or property furnished." 
Appellants are not seeking damages from Marsing. They have not 
waited until the conclusion of the contract to sue on the contract, nor are 
they seeking the return of their money. They seek reformation of the contract 
and cancellation of the warranty deed to the disputed acre from Marsing to 
Dennis and from Dennis to McBride. Because their actions are based on 
fraud or mistake the three year statute of limitation is governing. The reason 
for the three year statute of limitation contained in 78-12-26(3) is discussed 
in Davidsen V Salt Lake City, 81 P2d 374, 95 Utah 347, where it is stated 
on page 376 as follows: 
"This is for the very cogent reason that a person claiming to have 
been defrauded or to have been induced to enter into a contract by 
mistake should not be permitted to allow a great length of time to 
lapse after discovery of the fraud or mistake before instituting his 
suit . Otherwise, false claims of fraud or mistake might be asserted 
after the opposing party is unable to meet the issue because of death 
or absence of witnesses or destruction of vouchers and proofs." 
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ft * * *
 H e m a y i n o n e a c t i o n t j t i s t r u e ^ a s k f o r cancellation of 
the deed and to have his title quieted and recover possession of 
the real estate. But if his relief in each case depends as here upon 
the cancellation of a deed for fraud or mistake he must bring his 
action within the period provided by law for an action based upon 
that ground . It would be extremely mischievous if a person claim-
ing to be a victim of fraud or mistake were permitted to delay bring-
ing his action until nearly seven years after the discovery of the 
fraud or mistake upon which he relys ." (Emphasis added) 
In Doxey-Layton Company v. Clark, 548 P2d 902 (1976), the court 
held that the three year statute of limitations did not begin to run as of the 
date of the contract but as of the date when the deed was recorded, which 
was the time when the grantor should have discovered the mistake. 
The latest case from the Utah Supreme Court to speak on the issue 
of the applicability of 78-12-26(3) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
is Haslem v. Ottosen, 639 P2d 27. This is a case to reform a warranty deed 
to exclude "after acquired" mineral rights because it was alleged it was the 
intention that no such rights be conveyed inasmuch as at the time of the 
conveyance the grantor had no such rights and the grantee knew such to be 
the fact. The court state: 
"Both parties agree that Plaintiffs action is based on mutual mistake. 
The applicable statute of limitation, which was the basis of the trial 
court rulings is U.C.A. 1953, Section 78-12-26 (3), Davidsen v. 
Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 81 P2d 374(1938) , it provides: fWithin 
three years' * * * * (3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud 
or mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed 
to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake * * * * . ' 
1
 In Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P 426 (1916), this court 
construed the predecessor to Section 78-12-26(3) and held that discovery 
occurs when facts arise which would put a reasonable prudent person 
on notice to inquire into the matter. Additionally, if no inquiry is 
made one is held to have discovered all that would have been revealed 
if reasonable inquiry had been made. * * * * Both cases held that the 
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statute of limitations did not being to run until the mistake was 
discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could 
have been discovered. f f 
The above case clearly and unequivocably stands for the proposition 
that the three year statute of limitations commences running at such time as 
the aggrieved party learns of the fraud or mistake or should have. 
The Haslem case cites Davidsen v^Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 81 
P2d 374, which was a case seeking to reform a deed based upon the obtaining 
of the same by fraud. The court, thereon, at page 378, held that the three 
year statute of limitations applied and quoted extensively from Weight v . 
Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 P2d 899 (1915) , as follows: 
"Plaintiff brought a suit to reform a written contract and recover 
judgment according to its terms when reformed (Emphasis added) . 
The three year statute of limitations relating to actions for relief on 
the ground of fraud or mistake pleaded in defense and the trial 
court held the suit to be barred by such statute. Upon appeal the 
Plaintiff urged that the statute did not apply and that an action to 
reform a written instrument might be brought at any time while 
an action upon the instrument could be brought to enforce i t . 
(Emphasis added.) It was also urged that 'mere lapse of time does 
not bar any case of purely equitable jurisdiction. f 
f
 This court held that the three year statute applied, the court 
saying (Page 901); f 
fIf the contract did not address the agreement made by 
the [Respondent and himself (Appellant) he then had 
full notice of that fact and, hence, was required to bring 
the action to reform the contract so as to make it evidence 
the agreement as made. Such an action he was required 
to bring within three years from the time he learned of 
all the facts constituting the fraud or mistake pleaded 
by him. * * * We are clearly of the opinion that both upon 
principal and authority under a statute like ours the 
right of action was ba r red . " (Emphasis added) 
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POINT TWO 
WHETHER A SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY 
CHARGED WITH INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE AND CLAIMS OF 
A PURPORTED PRIOR PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY BY 
REASON OF RECORDING OF A NOTICE OF CONTRACT INTEREST, 
AND AFTER PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF CLAIM TO REAL PRO-
PERTY, CAN BE PLACED IN TITLE BECAUSE OF THE RUNNING 
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (THREE YEARS FROM 
MISTAKE) PRIOR TO AN ACTION BEING BROUGHT TO COR-
RECT AN ERROR IN THE CONTRACT AND DEED . 
In February , 1979, when Appellant Beckstead sold her interest in 
the contract with Marsing to Appellants Bertrand and Fontaine, Appellants 
Bertrand and Fontaine recorded the document entitled "Notice of Contract" 
in the office of the Weber County Recorder which stated that the said 
Appellants claimed an interest in and to the real property described in 
said notice, which property showed a beginning point of 609 feet North of 
the true point of beginning, which description would include the disputed 
acre . 
The only effect of the recording of said notice is to appraise subse-
quent purchasers of the claim of Bertrand and Fontaines' . no matter how 
faulty, but did not establish the ownership of Bertrand and Fontaines' to the 
property described in said notice. Such a notice is merely a warning to 
subsequent purchasers that they buy the disputed property at their r i sk . 
Generally, it remains for future litigation to determine the priority of r ights 
between the par t ies . The trial court has already determined that any rights 
that the Appellants, Bertrand and Fonatine, have to the disputed acre have 
been barred by the three year statute of limitation, 78-12-26 (3) . 
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POINT THREE 
WHETHER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD AND 
MISTAKE IS TOLLED WHERE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE 
STATUTE RUNS IS IN POSSESSION OR CONSTRUCTIVE 
POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES. 
In as much as this matter was presented to the court on Motions 
for Summary Judgment no parties nor witnesses were sworn and testified in 
open court and there was before the court only the pleadings of the par t ies , 
the affidavit of Appellant, Gay Beckstead, the affidavit of Donald Ray Dennis, 
and the deposition of Gay Beckstead. There are no pleadings of appellants 
alleging that any of the Appellants were in actual or constructive possession 
of the premises . However, the court has before it the affidavit of Respondents 
Dennis that he had enclosed the disputed area with a fence and that he 
was in the sole possession of the disputed acre and occupied it to the 
exclusion of all other part ies (R 121, 122) . 
The case of Jensen v . Manila Corporation of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints, 565 P2d 63, cited by Appellants is not authority 
for Appellantsf position. It is incorrect to allege "Statute of Limitations for 
fraud and mistake does not apply where one against whom the statute is to 
be asserted is in possession." The Statute of Limitations for Fraud and Mistake 
(78-12-26 (3)) was not raised as a defense in that case, nor was it discussed 
on appeal. Laches was raised by the defendant on page 65, but not the 
three year statute of limitations. Laches and the three year statute of 
limitations are two different doctrines as "Laches", according to Blacks Law 
Dictionary is defined as "Qmmission to assert a right for an unreasonable 
11 
and unexplained length of time under circumstances prejudicial to the 
adverse pa r ty . " The statute relied upon requires action by the aggrieved 
party within the limits of three years after discovery or should have dis-
covered the fraud or mistake (Haslem v . Ottosen, 639 P2d 27, Davidsen 
v . Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 81 P2d 374) . 
The court in the Jensen case, supra , quoting from Tapler v . 
F ray , 194 PSupp 239, 132 A2d 890, as follows: 
"Plaintiffs were in undisturbed possession of the premises and 
there was no occasion to bring the action earl ier . Laches will 
not be imputed to one constantly in complete possession of 
Premises, the title to which is in controversy." (Emphasis added) 
Thus , it can easily be seen that the court in the Jensen case, supra, 
was speaking only of laches and not the three year statute of limitatios 78-
12-26 (3) , and its holding was based on "undisturbed1 , 'constant" and com-
plete possession. 
In the case before the court, the record is completely void of 
any allegations or evidence that Appellants were in possession of any 
portion of the disputed acre for any period of time. The only evidence 
is that Respondent Dennis was in sole and exclusive possession of the 
disputed acre . (R 121, 122) . 
POINT FOUR 
WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS AGAINST A 
PARTY IN AN ACTION WHO FILES AN ACTION AFTER DISCOVERY 
OF A MISTAKE BUT DOES NOT ALLEGE FRAUD OR MISTAKE. 
In support of the Appellants position they cite Haws v . Jensen, 
(Utah) 209 P2d 229. This case did not involve fraud or mistake nor were 
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there any allegations as to either. This was an action to enforce an oral 
trust agreement upon real property. The three year statute of limitation 
was held not to apply because the facts upon which it could be applied simply 
were not raised by the parties nor considered by the trial court, but the 
defense was raised for the first time on appeal. 
The fact of the matter is that in the case before the court, in 
paragraphs four and five of the complaint, the Plaintiffs allege both fraud 
and mistake (R 2, 3) , although a finding of either fraud or mistake would 
be sufficient to support the decision of the trial court. 
The following from paragraphs 4 and 5 of said complaint is significant. 
"That during the negotiations for the sale of said property, said 
defendants, Marsing, represented to said plaintifffs, Beckstead, 
that there were ten acres of land in said property. That during 
said negotiations Defendants, Marsings, represented to Plaintiff 
Beckstead, that the location of the southern boundry of said parcel 
was a fence, which fence was approximately 609 feet North from the 
center of a county road. That in fact the description for said con-
tract was changed so as to include only nine acres rather than the 
ten acres sold by the defendant . * * * Because of an error in the 
description, 913 was inserted on the seventh line of the description 
in the place of 609. In order to make the deed describe the subject 
property and to make it conform to the actual intention of the parties 
number 609 should be inserted in the seventh line in place of 913.6.f 
f 5. During the spring of 1979, Plaintifs s discovered the error in 
the contract and deed." (Emphasis added) 
There can be no doubt that Appellants felt that there was (1) a 
misrepresentation as to the actual acreage to be conveyed, (2) a unilaterally 
changing of the contract and deed to provide for the conveyance of nine acres 
only instead of ten acres , (3) that there was an error in the description. 
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All of the above leads to only one conclusion. That there was either 
fraud on the part of the Defendant's Marsings or there was a mistake as to 
the amount of ground to be conveyed and this is reflected in the contract and 
deed. There can be no other conclusion than that the three year statute of 
limitations must govern in this matter and the three years had expired on 
the spring of 1982 as was found by the trial court and not in August of 1982. 
CONCLUSION 
The pleadings of Appellants and the facts show that there was 
either fraud or mistake involved in the transaction between Appellants, 
Beckstead, and Respondents, Marsings, in October 1977 and that said 
fraud or mistake was discovered by Appellants, Beckstead, Bertrand and 
Fontaine in the spring of 1979, March or April, but under no circumstances 
later than May 8, 1979, and that the three year statute of limitations 
provided for in 78-12-26(3) (Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended) 
is governing and the action of the Appellants is barred . The judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED AND SIGNED this / / fyfy of April, 1985. 
ANDY TjZ GEORGE B. a 
Attorney for Defend ants / 
Respondents McBride 
2650 Washington Blvd. , Suite 102 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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ADDENDUM 
15 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAY M. BECKSTEAD, JEANNE 
BERTRAND, and JEANNE FONTAINE, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. MARSING, GAY MARSING, 
DONALD RAY DENNIS, FRANCIC H. ] 
DENNIS, JEFFREY W. MC BRIDE, ) 
and BARBARA H. MC BRIDE, 
Defendants. 
i RULING ON 
i SUMMARY 
1 Case No. 
MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT 
. 82896 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint prays for reformation of uniform 
real estate contract. The action is based on misrepresentation 
and mistake. It appears plaintiff learned of the incorrect 
description in the deed no later than May of 1979. This action 
was filed in August, 1982. It became evident to plaintiffs no 
later than May of 1979 that Defendant Marsing would not be able 
to perform the contract other than as written. Plaintiff claims 
that the statute of limitations does not run on this matter until 
final payment is made on the contract. I hold that the statute 
of limitations in regard to reforming the contract started to run 
no later than May of 1979. Vendor may have until final payment 
to perform per the terms of the contract, but this is not the 
16 
-2-
same thing as performing per a reformed contract. I hold statute 
of limitations of three years had run in this matter, and 
plaintiffs1 action is, therefore, barred. 
DATED this / day of November, 1984. 
R(£NALD 0. HYDE, Judg 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of November, 1984, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
Robert E. Froerer 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
536 24th Street, Suite 2B 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Defendants Marsing 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
George B. Handy 
Attorney for Defendants McBride 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
V^ 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
82896 
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GEORGE B. HANDY 
Attorney for 
2650 Washington Blvd. , Suite 102 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-4015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAY M. BECKSTEAD, et al ] 
Plaintiff, 
v s . ] 
ROBERT W . MARSING, et al ] 
Defendant. 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 Civil No. 82896 
The Motion of Summary Judgment of Defendant, Jeffery W. McBride and 
Barbara H. McBride, having come on for hearing before the above entitled court , 
the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde pres id ing, on the 5th day of October, 1984; the 
plaintiffs not being personally present but being represented by their counsel of 
record , Robert E. F roe re r , Esq . ; defendants, Jeffery W. McBride and Barbara 
H. McBride, not being personally present but being represented by their counsel 
of record , George B . Handy, Esq . ; and the court having heard the arguments of 
counsel and having fully considered the record here in , deposition of plaintiff 
Beckstead and being fully advised in the premises now makes the following Finding 
of Fact: 
/ 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiffs and defendants are residents of Weber County, Utah. 
2. That the real property which is the subject of the matter of this lawsuit 
is located in Weber County, Utah. 
3. On or about the 5th day of October, 1977, defendants, Robert W. Marsing 
and Gay Marsing, sold to plaintiff, Beckstead, the following description of property 
situated in Weber County, Utah, to-wit: 
Part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 11, Township 6 North, 
Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U .S . Survey: 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of said Northwest Quarter 
Section and running thence South 1.22 chains; thence North 
83° East 1.81 chains; thence South 77o20f East 9.4 chains; 
thence South 6o20f West 9.74 chains; thence South 73° East 
5.95 chains; thence South 14° West 20.88 chains to center of 
county road; thence South 74°50' East 385.0 feet along center 
line of road, and North 13°52f East 913.6 feet to the true 
point of Beginning; running thence North 13°52f East 1571.4 
feet, more or l e s s , to the North line of said Northwest Quarter 
Section; thence North 89°41f East 400 feet, more or less , along 
said North line to the Northwest corner of John Perry Slater 
property; thence South 5°56' West 703.47 feet, more or less 
to the Southwest corner of said Slater property; thence East 
72.72 feet; thence South 1°06! West 15 feet to the center of 
Four-Mile Creek; thence South 59°08l40,! West 91.9 feet along 
said creek centerline; thence West 75 feet along said creek 
centerline to the Northwest corner of the Carl S. Pickett 
property; thence Northwesterly along said creek centerline 
to a point which bears South 74°50l East 143 feet, and North 
13°52f East 1436.4 feet from the true point of beginning; 
thence South 13°52f West 1436.4 feet, and North 74°50f West 
143 feet, more or less to the true point of Beginning. 
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4. That by Warranty Deed, dated December 5, 1977, and recorded in tit 
office of the recorder of Weber County, Utah, on May 8, 1979, defendants, Rot 
W. Marsing and Gay Marsing, conveyed to defendants, Donald Ray Dennis and 
Francis H. Dennis , the following real property situated in Weber County, Utah 
to-wit: 
Part of the Northwest quar ter of Section 11, Township 6 North, 
Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U .S . Survey: 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of said Northwest Quarter 
Section and running thence South 1.22 chains; thence North 83° 
East 1.81 chains; thence South 77°2tT East 9.4 chains; thence 
South 6°20? West 9.74 chains; thence South 73° East 5.95 chains , 
thence South 14° West 20 .88 chains to center of county road; 
thence South 74°50' East 385.0 feet along center line of road; 
thence North 13°52t East 609 .0 feet to the true point of beginning; 
running thence North 13°52' East 304.6 feet; thence South 
74°50' East 143.0 feet; thence South 13°52! West 304.6 feet; 
thence North 74°50f West 143.0 feet to the true point of 
beginning. Containing 1.0 ac res . 
5. That on or about the 31st day of Ju ly , 1981, Donald Ray Dennis and 
Francis H. Dennis conveyed the above described property to Jeffery W. McBride 
6. Plaintiffs contend and alleged that the one acre of real property above 
described was sold to plaintiff and that b&fraud and misrepresentation the legal 
description of the real property contained in the contract between plaintiff, 
Beckstead, and defendant, Robert W. Marsing and Gay Marsing, dated October 1, 
1977, did not contain said one ac re . 
7. Plaintiffs alleged that said fraud and mistake was discovered in the 
spring of 1979. 
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7. That on August 19, 1982, the plaintiffs filed the above entitled action 
praying for reformation of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated October 5, 1977, 
and alleged as grounds , therefore, misrepresentation and mistake. 
8. Plaintiffs learned of the incorrect description in the deed and the 
contract dated October 5, 1977, no later than May, 1979, when the deed from 
Robert W. Marsing and Gay Marsing to Donald Ray Dennis and Francis H. Dennis 
for the disputed one acre was recorded. It had become evident to plaintiffs no 
later than May, 1979, that defend'ants Marsing would not be able to perform the 
contract other than as writ ten. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing facts, the court finds the judgment 
in favor of the defendants, Jeffery W. McBride and Barbara H. McBride and against 
the plaintiffs, Gay M. Beckstead, Jeanne Bertrand and Jeanne Fontaine, as follows: 
1. That the statute 73-12-26 (3) Utah Code Anotated 1953 as amended applies 
to the facts of this case and the said three year statue of limitations commenced to 
run in May 1979. and plaintiffs actions is therefore barred and judgment is awarded 
in favor of defendants, Jeffery W. McBride and Barbara H. McBride for no cause of 
action. 
DATED AND SIGNED this < 3 d a y ^ f i ^ ^ T b e r , 198*|T 
JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
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GEORGE B. HANDY 
Attorney for 
2650 Washington B lvd . , Suite 102 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-4015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
S 
GAY M. BECKSTEAD, et al ] 
Plaintiff, 
v s . ] 
ROBERT W MARSING , et al ] 
Defendant. 
Civi: 
'" T 
JUDGMENT 
So 82896 
The Motion of Summary Judgment of Defendant, Jeffery W. McBride and 
Barbara H. McBride , having come on for hearing before the above entitled cour 
the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde pres id ing , on the 5th day of October, 1984; the 
plaintiffs not being personally present but being represented by tlaeir counsel o. 
record, Robert E. F roere r , Esq. ; defendants, Jeffery W. McBride and Barbara 
H . McBride, not being personally present but being represented by their counse 
of record , George B . Handy , Esq.; and the court having heard the arguments of 
counsel and having fully considered the record, deposition and other evidence 
adduced therein and being fully advised in the premises oakes the following orde 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's 
motion for summary judgment is granted and the afction of the plaintiff is barred. 
DATED AND SIGNED this ^ day of No^ftffer , 198^ 
JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
Robert E. Froerer 
Plain tiff's attorney 
23 
78-12-26(3) WITHIN THREE YEARS 
Within three years : * * * (3) An action for relief on the grounds 
of fraud or mistake: but the cause of action in such case shall 
not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituted in the fraud or mistake. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I h e r e b y certify that I mailed four t rue and co r r ec t copies of the 
above Responden t ' s Brief to each of the following: 
ROBERT E. FROERER, Esq . 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
536 - 24th S t r ee t , Suite 2B 
Ogden, UT 84401 
LaVAR E . STARK, E s q . 
Attorney for Defendnats / 
Responden ts Mars ing 
2485 Grant A v e n u e , Suite 200 
Ogden , UT 84401 * 
pos tage p r e p a i d , th is / y day of Apr i l , 1985. 
JEORGE B . H| 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t s / 
R e s p o n d e n t s M c B r i d e 
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